Dark Continet: Europe's Twentieth Century by Mark Mazower
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MARK MAZOWER. *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century.* London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1998. Pp. xv, 495. £20.00.

DESPITE THE CHRONOLOGICAL allusion in its subtitle, this penetrating and provocative study focuses on the period since the end of the First World War. The book is unabashedly selective rather than inclusive in its choice of topics, qualifying it as an extended essay rather than a comprehensive text or a reliable reference work. The absence of Ernest Bevin, Willy Brandt, Alexander Dubček, Pierre Mendès-France, Jean Monnet, Imre Nagy, Helmut Schmidt, or Lech Wałęsa from this story suggests that Mark Mazower is not interested in recounting the history of these eventful years in the conventional form of a chronological narrative. Instead, Mazower has organized the wealth of information that he has gleaned from a wide range of secondary sources around a set of general themes that, he believes, explain the transformation of European life since 1919.

The portrait of Europe that emerges is that of a continent torn apart and then split in two by the clash of incompatible ideologies. The demise of monarchical absolutism with the collapse of the Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, and Romanov empires left Europeans with a choice of three alternative models of political authority and economic development. The proponents of liberal democracy, Marxism, and Fascism each found adherents at different times and in different places until the advent of the Second World War, when the democratic alternative seemed doomed all across the continent. Mazower emphasizes that the disappearance of Fascism after 1945 did not leave the old continent with the stark choice between the market capitalism of the United States and Soviet-style Communism. The *étatisme*, economic planning, and social welfare policies of post-war France, Britain, Sweden, and other countries, was as much a reaction to the failed model of market capitalism in the 1930s as to the Communist model of total state control.

A striking feature of Mazower's analysis is his appreciative assessment of the economic successes of Communism after 1945. The Soviet Union was able to achieve hegemony over Eastern Europe not only through intimidation but also by capitalizing on widespread admiration for the remarkable Soviet achievement of forced industrialization organized by the state and financed by domestic savings rather than foreign capital. In a useful corrective to the universally critical evaluation of Eastern European economic policies, he reminds us that the peoples' democracies (with East Germany leading the pack) managed to achieve a respectable record of industrial development throughout the 1950s, despite the unavailability of American aid.

In his assessment of the origins of the cold war in Europe, Mazower rejects the conventional view of an epic confrontation between two incompatible, hostile blocs. Joseph Stalin did regard Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria as essential to Soviet security and therefore insisted on absolute control there. But elsewhere in the region he revived the old Popular Front strategy of building coalitions with

non-Communist parties to secure and retain power through parliamentary means. Even after the closure of this 'window of opportunity' for East-West reconciliation by 1947, Mazower observes, each superpower scrupulously honoured the informal spheres-of-influence bargain struck at the wartime conferences: both Moscow and Washington refrained from meddling directly in each other's sphere. Propaganda, espionage, and economic competition replaced military power as the means of waging the cold war in Europe. No border disputes would degenerate into interstate violence, as in 1914-45, a happy circumstance which afforded the war-ravaged continent a breathing space within which it could (and did) recover splendidly.

Mazower regards race and ethnicity, rather than political ideology or economics, as the motive force of Europe's tragic history since the end of the First World War. Adolf Hitler's obsession with expanding the living space of his chosen people at the expense of what he regarded as the Slavic and Jewish *Untermenschen* to the east set a precedent that would survive the demise of the Third Reich. The Red Army conducted an indiscriminate campaign of rape and murder of German civilians as it drove westwards at the end of the war, herding the survivors into detention camps where they were forced to wear swastikas as an ethnic stigma. Twelve million Germans were evicted from their ancestral homes in the east, some by the advancing Russians, the rest by the post-liberation regimes in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, all with the tacit approval of the very Western allies that had piously invoked the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination in their wartime pronouncements from the Atlantic Charter to the Declaration on Liberated Europe.

This is a book replete with pointed, pithy observations that occasionally lapse into exaggeration: evaluating the spread of democratic institutions to Eastern Europe after the First World War, Mazower concludes that 'because democracy was about the creation of national communities, it was generally anti-Semitic'; Hitler's henchman, Albert Speer, is characterized as 'a pioneer of the industrial arrangements that would lead to the European Coal and Steel Community and ultimately to the Common Market'. All in all, however, this trenchant essay on Europe's descent from the pinnacle of world power will provoke its readers to re-evaluate many of the received opinions about that central development in the history of the twentieth century.

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GUIDO MÜLLER, ed. *Deutschland und der Westen: Internationale Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert: Festschrift für Klaus Schwabe zum 65. Geburtstag.* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998. Pp. 381. DM 138, paper.

IN ONE WAY or another, Germany has stood at the centre of European foreign relations throughout the twentieth century. In this collection of thirty-one articles honouring Klaus Schwabe on his sixty-fifth birthday, Guido Müller brings

Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide & Terror by Neil J. Kressel; The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity by Kristen Renwick Monroe
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experience, especially for those interested in the environmental dimensions of political theory. The quality of the papers is as impressive as Benton's ability to demonstrate their richness and importance. And for those of us asking ourselves about the requirements of a sustainable society, this book is invaluable in demonstrating the thriving potential of Marxist thought, as well as the high caliber of these scholars struggling to bring Marx into the 21st century.

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Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide & Terror. By Neil J. Kressel. New York: Plenum Press. 1996.

The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity. By Kristen Renwick Monroe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1996.

Each spring, I teach an honors undergraduate course entitled "The Social Psychology of Good and Evil," and I have placed these two books high on the reading list. *Mass Hate* is near the top; for reasons noted below, *The Heart of Altruism* is a bit lower. Kressel's *Mass Hate,* like Ervin Staub's *The Roots of Evil* (1989), explores the social and psychological causes of great atrocities. *The Heart of Altruism,* like Sam and Pearl Oliner's *The Altruistic Personality* (1988) and Eva Fogelman's *Conscience & Courage* (1994), examines (among others) those who, at great risk, rescued Jews during the Holocaust. As we struggle to understand the extremes of human evil and saintliness, both new books offer helpful analyses and insights not found in these other recent works.

Neil Kressel wrote *Mass Hate* to make genocide and terror "understandable to non-professional readers" (personal communication, July 1996). Working from four modern examples:

> The goal is to uncover meaningful and valid generalizations, not for the sake of knowledge itself, but to suggest strategies to reduce crimes of hate in the future. . . . This book grows out of my belief that historical and psychological inquiry can illuminate the places where mass hatred grows, and that the public should be made aware of this knowledge. (pp. 10–11)

The aim is to understand the psychology of the masses who participate in atrocities rather than the pathology of the leaders. With the general public as the intended audience, the language is simple and direct.

Understanding genocide requires knowing each event in great detail as well as a search for universal principles. With searing detail, four separate chapters

describe the atrocities committed by Serbs in Bosnia, Muslim extremists in bombing the World Trade Center, Hutus in Rwanda, and followers of Hitler. Kressel tells each story well and documents it thoroughly.

For Bosnia and Rwanda, the task is to "understand what it takes to transform primarily peaceful cohabitants into enemies thirsting for blood" (p. 20). Kressel minimizes the significance of "the doctrine of ancient hatreds"—the belief that ethnic hatreds have smoldered for centuries, were merely suppressed by dictatorships, and that the end of these dictatorships provided for their release. This doctrine "tells us little about how distant historical events become psychologically relevant and meaningful for the individual" (p. 21). Kressel rightly suspects that this doctrine is born largely as rationalization: in the West, from a reluctance to intervene; among protagonists, from a need for absolution for their current atrocities.

There are plenty of identifiable genocidal leaders. For example, Zeljko Raznatovic was able to propel a violent criminal career into leadership of the savage "Tigers" and to become a mythic hero in the process. Raznatovic's long-standing savagery was merely reframed to serve Serbian Orthodoxy and nationalism. But such vile men require willing followers, and to Kressel, "The key question . . . is why so many people were willing to act in blatant disregard of moral and social inhibitions before this behavior was accepted and became the norm" (pp. 34–35). Kressel sees four critical steps, all accomplished through a vigorous propaganda campaign: "the reinvigoration of nationalist sentiments . . ., the intensification of the culture of toughness [already a cultural characteristic among the Serbs] . . ., the reactivation of historical fears and resentments, . . . [and] the stimulation of a desire for revenge" (p. 36).

The 1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda took more than 500,000 lives. Despite Hutu protests that the killings were spontaneous and unfortunate responses to Tutsi aggression, U.N. investigators found ample evidence that the genocide was "concerted, planned [months in advance], systematic and methodical . . ." (p. 90).

Most Westerners were ill-prepared to understand events in this small, interior African nation. The Tutsis, a cattle-herding, tall and light-skinned people, arrived in the 16th century and immediately assumed their own natural superiority over the shorter and darker Hutus. Over the centuries, the languages and cultures fused, and the physical characteristics were blurred through intermarriage, but the minority Tutsis retained all political power.

The German and Belgian (after World War I) colonialists initially reinforced Tutsi rule and Tutsi-Hutu differentiation by superimposing a pseudo-scientific racial theory, but they also sought to transform Tutsi rule over the Hutus from mere domination to beneficent paternalism. With education, Western concepts of equality and democracy began to permeate the Hutus and to engender disenchantment with their subservience. And by imposing their own authority, the colonialists undermined the traditional authority of the Tutsi kings.

When Belgians ended their colonial rule in 1962, placing the Hutu majority in control, this decolonialization was "charged with genocidal potential" (p. 99). More than 400,000 Tutsis fled, and the 1960s were marked with periodic slaughters. The presidency of Juvenal Habyarimana (1973–1994) provided two decades of calm, due largely to a policy of distributing government jobs and education proportionate to the population of the groups. An extremist ideology of Hutuism, holding that all Tutsis must be killed, lay dormant during this period, but surged when exiled Tutsis, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded in 1990, and particularly when President Habyarimana signed a peace accord that brought RPF members into the government and armed forces. Fearful that many exiled Tutsis would return home and reclaim confiscated property, various Hutuist leaders began to actively call for genocide. The Hutuist paper *Kangura* issued the "Hutu Ten Commandments." Number eight: "The Hutu must not have mercy on the Tutsi." Hutuist Radio Milles Collines encouraged slaughter, first through euphemisms such as "killing the cockroaches around our houses" and later by direct calls to kill Tutsis with instructions on how to do it.

Following the presentation of the four cases, two thoughtful chapters examine how well-known psychological research on situational forces and personality helps us understand atrocities; in both cases, Kressel finds these explanations incomplete. Milgram's classic obedience-to-authority paradigm offers a little help, for it is difficult to imagine atrocities occurring without strong human propensities toward obedience and conformity. Yet mindless obedience hardly describes the enthusiasm displayed by all four groups of perpetrators. And while the behavior required in the Milgram studies occurred quickly, offering little time for moral reflection on one's actions, large-scale slaughter requires preparation, often over decades. A convincing moral rationale and "ideology of hatred" must be supplied, and psychic images of the victims as "rats," "insects," or "cancer" must be implanted. Lesser abuses must become routine. The Milgram paradigm also can't account for the fact that so many perpetrators self-select, particularly in the early stages. Still, Kressel recognizes that the right circumstances can cause psychologically healthy young men to spiral down quickly into cruelty, as was shown by Zimbardo's prison simulation and Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros's study of the education of torturers. Following Herbert Kelman's analysis, Kressel concludes that mass terror requires three stages: "authorization," an implicit approval or encouragement from authority figures; the "routinization" of lesser crimes; and the "dehumanization" of the victims.

Nevertheless, we vary from eagerness to great resistance in our readiness for mass hate. While even "the strongest consciences will cave in to some powerful pressures . . . those predisposed . . . to hate and kill will take the lead, eagerly indulging their lust for destructiveness . . . [and] those with a moderate predisposition will follow . . ." (p. 213). The early followers are not of one nature, however; research suggests to Kressel four overlapping types: fascism-prone authoritarians, the merely obedient, uneducated killers, and aggressive killers. This typology is by

no means final, but it does summarize fairly well what is known about the personality dynamics of rank-and-file perpetrators.

In his final chapter, Kressel addresses the issue, "What is to be done?" He places little hope in U.N. or NATO intervention with peacekeepers. Such interventions are likely to maintain peace only as long as the peacekeepers remain, often compel support for one unworthy faction over another, and usually don't serve the "vital national interests" of the intervening forces. Recent history increases doubt that humanitarian reasons alone can sustain such interventions. Kressel similarly doubts that the world can reduce genocide very much by "breaking the habit of unquestioning obedience" (p. 269), by building an ethic that we are all members of a common humanity, by educational programs about genocide ("An intellectual understanding of genocide constitutes a very weak defense against the pressures that typically lead to mass murder," p. 273), or by reducing poverty. To Kressel, our greatest long-term success will come through the promotion of stable democratic systems and through the relentless pursuit of perpetrators. Genocide occurs almost exclusively under totalitarian or authoritarian systems, for a variety of reasons that Kressel enumerates. Democracy's main fault is complicity. And turning perpetrators into international pariahs and doing all that is possible to bring them to justice can deter other potential perpetrators and their followers.

Mass Hate has a few marginal faults. A few inclusions, such as a discourse on Susan Brownmiller's analysis of rape, don't really contribute. Kressel mistakenly equates social dominance with authoritarianism. Not fully understanding the scales' psychometrics, I think, he is inappropriately critical of items that measure authoritarianism and related constructs and of their purported left-wing bias. He wrongly characterizes Soviet authoritarianism as left-wing, although it has all of the psychological qualities defining right-wing authoritarianism.

Mass Hate has less integration with psychological theory than does Staub's *The Roots of Evil.* Both, I think, underestimate the role of psychological dissonance and how it may cause atrocities, once begun, to self-perpetuate. Festinger's classic cognitive dissonance theory, not cited in either text, predicts that as we abuse others we must make ourselves believe that they deserve it. At My Lai, some American soldiers cried, "Die, you dirty Viet Cong bastard!" at the women and children they massacred. Dissonance theory suggests that they *had* to label their victims in this way, and that by doing so, the slaughter was carried on to completion rather than halted. The dehumanization of victims is caused by, as well as causes, their victimization. In a vicious spiral, each propels the other toward greater malignity.

Most important, Kressel's solutions are all questionable. He underestimates the capacity of international organizations for building as well as keeping peace, the progress already made in creating a belief in a common humanity (embodied most clearly in the modern concept of human rights), and the power of educating about genocide. The virtues of democracy are well-stated, but also overstated. Modern democracies may commit few mass atrocities, but their surrogates certainly do. Democratic nations' recent crimes far exceed complicity. And while

deterrence is untested in the arena of international war crimes, research on the deterrent effects of punishment on other crimes has offered, at best, weak support.

I ask my honors class, "How many of you have a deep sense of 'oneness with all mankind'?" A few hands rise quickly, while the remaining students appear perplexed by the question. A gulf seems to separate the two groups; the sense of common humanity appears to be categorically present or not, and not distributed on a bell-shaped curve. As best I can tell, my course changes very few.

In *The Heart of Altruism,* Kristen Monroe advances such a thesis: The critical feature of altruists is their pervasive sense of being part of a "common humanity"; non-altruists sense, instead, a separateness from "a world of strangers" (p. 3). Still, the "altruistic perspective" can vary a little bit in degree. On a continuum, ranging from entrepreneurs to rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust, Monroe envisions that such a perspective of a common humanity would be virtually absent in the entrepreneurs, slightly present among philanthropists (those who have earned and then give away huge sums), much stronger among heroes and heroines (individuals who engaged in one or more life-risking acts to save another), and a centrally defining quality of the rescuers.

Monroe set out to prove this theory through 45-minute interviews with five entrepreneurs, five philanthropists, five heroes and heroines, and 10 rescuers. Interviews were used to uncover the subtleties of each individual's view of self, relationships with others, human nature, normative behavior, and meaning ascribed to personal events and behaviors. In the author's judgment, these qualities are beyond the reach of standardized questionnaires or scales. The interviewees first told their own life stories; questioning designed to clarify their views on the central topics followed as needed.

Prototypical examples of each group are presented in separate chapters. Absorbing dialogue from these interviews is interwoven with the author's interpretations of the meaning of the answers.

"We belong to one human family," said one rescuer. Said another, ". . . just like the cells in your own body . . . we are all like cells of a community that is very important. Not American; I mean the human race. And you should always be aware that every other person is basically you." This perspective, Monroe concludes, is the heart of altruism. Altruists articulate it spontaneously; others rarely do. It is not merely the absence of self-centeredness or ethnocentrism; it is a cardinal identification with all human beings. It is, to altruists, *the* basic reality of human life. And so, altruists view their own life-endangering altruism as reflexive rather than the result of weighing costs and benefits, normative (what any normal person should do), a necessary act rather than a choice, and not particularly praiseworthy. And since altruism is essentially a *perspective,* the author suggests that it is not particularly associated with higher levels of moral reasoning or with emotional empathy.

The six final chapters contrast the author's theory of altruism with views derived from analysis of sociocultural variables, from the economic "rational

behavior" model, from evolutionary biology, and from academic psychology. To Monroe, all imagined or previously documented sociocultural correlates of altruism—religious faith, birth order, wealth, occupation, community closeness, family background, etc.—miss the mark and are effectively useless. The backgrounds of the rescuers and heroes were located at random spots on their variables, as were those of the entrepreneurs and philanthropists. The economic rational behavior model assumes that supposedly altruistic acts are actually based on rational, self-serving motives; these motives might be tangible (such as honor, material gain, or reciprocity), or merely psychic (self-approval, easing of guilt, etc.). In Monroe's interviews, the economic model appeared to fit the entrepreneurs quite well, and the philanthropists a little less so. But *none* of the heroes and altruists appear to fit this model, and applying it to them is pure dogmatism. Because the altruism was directed toward those outside one's own kin or ethnic group, evolutionary biology analyses of altruism are irrelevant. Finally, psychological approaches suggesting that altruism arises out of parental modeling and affection, from the development through stages of moral reasoning, or from various situational factors (modeling the behavior of others) all require forced fitting to explain the altruism of the rescuers and heroes. The key, in the end, is merely the altruistic perspective; altruists have it, others do not.

Monroe's altruistic perspective is almost certainly a part of the story. But the methodological problems of this research strike this reader as substantial. For starters, one cannot tell to what degree this view of altruism was derived from the interviews or imposed on them. Given the nature of the research, the interviewer could not be blind to the type of individual (entrepreneur, rescuer, etc.) being interviewed, but the structure of the interviews exacerbated this problem. The different groups apparently were given different rationales for the interviews; altruists were told that the study concerned altruism, while others were given different, unreported rationale. And while the author "wanted to avoid imposing my own views on others through asking predesigned questions" (p. 18), this lack of standardization meant that the questions asked each respondent were frequently very leading (to a predefined philanthropist, "Is it easier for you to give than it is to take?"). No second researcher was used during the interviews who might counter the author's own inclinations, or to listen to the tapes and offer independent analyses. The author's interpretations of the interviews are often a stretch. The tiny samples, which are carefully described, are glaringly insufficient for the firm conclusions and generalizations drawn about four kinds of people and the differences between them.

Even if the author's research had been better crafted, lots of research in social psychology raises doubts about the veracity of retrospective personal accounts of "why we did what we did." We know, for example, that our behavior shapes our perspectives and self-images, as well as vice versa. And so, those who have performed in life-endangering acts of rescue are likely to adopt the altruistic perspective, but they may not have held it beforehand. And those retrospective accounts are certainly not as

compelling in establishing altruism and disposing of the economic model as is Batson's creative research on the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

It seems natural to assume that those who hide Jews from Nazis, or rush into fires to save children, have a single quality that distinguishes them from non-altruists. But it is doubtful that they do, or that these rescuers are all of one kind. Interviewing more than 300 rescuers for *Conscience & Courage,* Fogelman found that the rescuers' orientations and motives were varied and complex, and only some of them appear to possess the altruistic perspective. And she noted that mere opportunity (just *having* a basement) was often the difference between those who hid Jews and those who did not. Many well-known rescuers, such as Oskar Schindler, appear to clearly defy Monroe's schema. Little in Schindler's narcissistic lifestyle before his heroic rescue work suggests an altruistic perspective.

In the end, *The Heart of Altruism* is half science and half sermon. Perhaps that will always be so in studies of rescuers and heroes. The task of understanding them will always be incomplete. Given that these interviews are necessarily after-the-fact, they can never offer the clarity and certitude we would all want. But for our common humanity, it is vital that the altruists' stories be told, and that we do what we can to both honor and understand them. So despite its shortcomings, *The Heart of Altruism* is a very worthy read.

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The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates. By Stanley A. Renshon. New York: New York University Press. 1996. 515 pp.

Among the possible applications of political psychology, few appear to have as much potential as the psychological assessment of U.S. presidential candidates. In recent presidential campaigns, questions of candidate "character" have loomed large; journalists and voters have looked eagerly for reliable answers. Yet scholars

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Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality by George L. Mosse
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Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality. By George L. Mosse (New York, Howard Fertig, 1980) 362 pp. $25.00

Mosse, known for his works on nationalism, German culture, and Jewish history, here presents a collection of essays aimed at bringing together selected elements from all of those earlier themes. The results of his effort are less than wholly successful; but what Mosse has given us both demands and repays careful reading.

The role of nationalism as the most powerful motive force in modern politics continues to fascinate the author, who, after pondering developments in Europe during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, judges that "each nation contained different nationalisms: conservative, liberal, or radical" (4). From this conclusion, it is a short step to a more specific, albeit hardly unpredictable, one: "The nationalism of the radical Right led into the fascist movements after World War I" (9).

The emphasis on nationalism seems justified in any attempt to analyze fascism, if allowance is made for the checkered past of many fascists as "rightists" or "leftists." That nationalism could provide a refuge for both antisocialists and anticapitalists is no longer a matter of doubt. What may strike some as more troublesome, given the events of recent years, is the flat pronouncement that "the model of the New Left was not the radical Right but the Marxist renaissance of the Weimar Republic" (17). Which "New Left"? That of Georg Lukacs and Theodor Adorno, or that of Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof? Fortunately, terminological, and even conceptual, problems need not dominate the present discussion.

Mosse is relatively cautious in his use of intra-European comparisons, limiting himself to a number of interesting pages on Gabriele D'Annunzio and to some discussion of Bonapartism and of *Les Jaunes* as a French contribution to the quest for a chauvinist-rightist labor movement at the turn of the twentieth century. Despite Mosse's concentration on the German case, however, his belief in fascism's existence as a general phenomenon reveals none of the misgivings that have lately been expressed by Allardyce, for example.[1]

More important in methodological terms is the author's skillful use of popular literature, including material drawn from the stage, as a source of help from another discipline for his effort to define and explain mass attitudes. Especially informative and challenging are such chapters as "Nazi Polemical Theater: The *Kampfbühne*" and "What Germans Really Read." (The latter includes reflections on the popularity of one of Hitler's favorites, Karl May, creator of "Old Shatterhand," a stern but decent German roaming the American West in the 1890s.)

Mosse does not seek to relate such reading and viewing to particular

1 Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept," *American Historical Review*, LXXXIV (1979), 367–388.

political attitudes, as Lowie, the ethnologist, might have set out to do. The documentation provided by *Masses and Men* nevertheless throws valuable light on some widely held German beliefs concerning courage, honor, race, and nationality—to mention only a few such preoccupations—and does so, blessedly, without a single invocation of "*mentalités*."[2]

The one disappointment in this absorbing book stems from bewilderment over the inclusion of Part III. It comprises a trio of essays dealing, respectively, with changes in modern Judaic theology and ecclesiology, the responses of German Jews to World War I, and the handling of the "Jewish question" by German socialist leaders in the Weimar period. These chapters have great merit in themselves, but they do not carry their share of the load in explicating the work's suggestive subtitle.

For Mosse's organizing concept, as that subtitle makes clear, rests on the distinction between historical studies of objective *conditions*—that is, of reality as best the historian may recapture it—on the one hand, and efforts to understand past perceptions of reality, on the other. Even the quotation from Karl Kautsky that "the Jewish masses have to be enlightened in order to counteract their Judaism" falls short of making the case for the inclusion of Part III in a book on nationalist and fascist perceptions (286).

The reward for careful reading lies in the persistence with which Mosse brings his reader back to the central failing of fascist perceptions. Whether or not one chooses to call it "illiberalism"—as Stern seems to me to have rightly done—the fascist aberration lay in repudiating a humane interest in the individual, in his or her idiosyncrasies, faults, virtues—and possibilities of generous achievement.[3]

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Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907–1917. By Robert Edelman (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1980) 252 pp. $19.75

This is the first published monograph on a right-wing party and also the first attempt at a political sociology of any party in Russia during the brief constitutional experiment of 1906–1917. According to Edelman, the Nationalist Party, founded in 1909, evolved a modern political organization in response to the peculiar socioeconomic position of the Russian gentry in the western provinces of the empire. He attributes the subsequent split and disintegration of the party during World War I to

2 Robert H. Lowie, *Toward Understanding Germany* (Chicago, 1954).
3 Fritz Stern, *The Failure of Illiberalism* (New York, 1972).